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Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals:
A Preliminary Investigation
Cass R. Sunstein,* David Schkade,** and Lisa Michelle Ellman***
Abstract
For many decades, the United States has been conducting an extraordinary
natural experiment: Randomly assigned three-judge panels on courts of appeals produce
extensive evidence of the effect of judicial ideology on judges’ votes. If the political party
of the appointing president is treated as a rough proxy for ideology, then it becomes
possible to test three hypotheses: (a) a judge’s votes, in ideologically contested areas,
can be predicted by the party of the appointing president; (b) a judge’s ideological
tendency, in such areas, will be amplified if the panel has two other judges appointed by
an appointing president of the same political party; and (c) a judge’s ideological
tendency, in such areas, will be dampened if the panel has no other judge appointed by
an appointing president of the same political party. All three hypotheses are confirmed in
many areas, including affirmative action, campaign finance, sex discrimination, sexual
harassment, piercing the corporate veil, disability discrimination, race discrimination,
and review of environmental regulations. An important implication is that panel
composition has a strong effect on likely outcomes, thus creating extremely serious
problems for the rule of law. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that judges
frequently issue collegial concurrences, that is, concurrences produced by the
unanimous views of the other judges on the panel, and that judges are subject to group
polarization, by which groups of like-minded people go to extremes. Notably, all three
hypotheses are rejected in the areas of federalism, criminal appeals, and takings of
private property, because Republican and Democratic appointees vote essentially alike.
In the areas of abortion and capital punishment, the first hypothesis is confirmed, but the
second and third are rejected, because judges vote their convictions, and are not affected
by the composition of the panel. Disaggregating the data by circuit allows courts of
appeals to be ranked along an ideological spectrum; it also shows striking differences
between Republican appointees and Democratic appointees on different circuits.
Normative implications are briefly explored.
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2Over many decades, the United States has been conducting an extraordinary
natural experiment with respect to the performance of federal judges. The experiment
involves the relationship between political ideology2 and judicial decisions.  Many people
believe that political ideology should not and generally does not affect legal judgments,3
and this belief contains some truth. Frequently the law is clear and judges should and will
simply implement it, whatever their political commitments. But what happens when the
law is unclear? What role does ideology play then?
It is extremely difficult to investigate these questions directly. But it is possible to
identify a proxy for political ideology: The political affiliation of the appointing
president. Presidents are frequently interested in ensuring that judicial appointees are of a
certain stripe. A Democratic president is unlikely to want to appoint judges who will seek
to overrule Roe v. Wade4 and strike down affirmative action programs. A Republican
president is unlikely to want to appoint judges who will understand the Constitution to
require states to recognize same-sex marriages. It is reasonable to hypothesize that as a
statistical regularity, judges appointed by Republican presidents (hereinafter described,
for ease of exposition, as Republican appointees) will be more conservative than judges
appointed by Democratic presidents (Democratic appointees, as we shall henceforth call
them). But is this hypothesis true? When is it true, and to what degree is it true?
More subtly, we might speculate that federal judges are subject to panel effects –
that on a three-judge panel, a judge’s likely vote is affected by whether she is sitting with
no, one, or two judges appointed by presidents of the same political party. On this view, a
Republican appointee, sitting with two Democratic appointees, is more likely to vote as
Democratic appointees typically do, whereas a Democratic appointee, sitting with two
Republican appointees, is more likely to vote as Republican appointees typically do. But
is this in fact the usual pattern? The invariable one? Since judges in a given circuit are
assigned to panels (and therefore to cases) randomly, the existence of a large data set
allows these issues to be investigated empirically.
In this Essay, we examine a subset of possible case types, focusing on a number of
controversial issues that seemed especially likely to reveal divisions between Republican
and Democratic appointees. In brief, we explore cases involving abortion, affirmative
action, campaign finance, capital punishment, commerce clause challenges to
congressional enactments, the contracts clause, criminal appeals, disability
discrimination, industry challenges to environmental regulation, piercing the corporate
veil, race discrimination, sex discrimination, and claimed takings of private property
without just compensation. We offer a more detailed description of our subjects and
methods below.   
More specifically, the central purpose of this Essay is to examine three central
                                                 
2 In using this term, we do not intend to venture anything especially controversial about the actual or
appropriate grounds of judicial decisions. As will be clear, we measure “ideology” by the political
affiliation of the appointing president.
3 See Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, New York Times Magazine, August 11, 2002, at 38.
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3hypotheses:
1. Ideological voting. On issues with a strong ideological flavor, Republican
appointees vote very differently from Democratic appointees. Such issues
include many of those just mentioned, such as affirmation action, campaign
finance, federalism, the rights of criminal defendants, sex discrimination,
piercing the corporate veil, racial discrimination, property rights, capital
punishment, disability discrimination, sexual harassment, and abortion.
2. Ideological dampening. A judge’s ideological tendency, in such cases, is
likely to be dampened if she is sitting with two judges from a different
political party. For example, a Democratic appointee should be less likely to
vote in a stereotypically liberal fashion5 if accompanied by two Republican
appointees, and a Republican appointee should be less likely to vote in a
stereotypically conservative fashion if accompanied by two Democratic
appointees.
3. Ideological amplification. A judge’s ideological tendency, in such cases, is
likely to be amplified if she is sitting with two judges from the same political
party. A Democratic appointee should show an increased tendency to vote in a
stereotypically liberal fashion if accompanied by two Democratic appointees,
and a Republican appointee should be more likely to vote in a stereotypically
conservative fashion if accompanied by two Republican appointees.
We find that in numerous areas of the law, all three hypotheses are strongly
confirmed. Each finds support in federal cases involving campaign finance, affirmative
action, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, piercing the corporate veil, racial
discrimination, disability discrimination, contract clause violations, and review of
environmental regulations. In such cases, the aggregate data strongly confirm all three
hypotheses. Indeed, we find many extreme cases of ideological dampening, which we
might call leveling effects, in which party differences are wiped out. With leveling
effects,  Democratic appointees, when sitting with two Republican appointees, are as
likely to vote in the stereotypically conservative fashion as are Republican appointees,
when sitting with two Democratic appointees. We also find strong amplification effects,
such that if the data set in the relevant cases is taken as a whole, Democratic appointees,
sitting with two Democratic appointees, are about twice as likely to vote in the
stereotypically liberal fashion as are Republican appointees, sitting with two Republican
appointees – a far larger disparity than the disparity between Democratic and Republican
votes when either is sitting with one Democratic appointee and one Republican
appointee. In most of the areas investigated here, the political party of the appointing
president is a fairly good predictor of how an individual judge will vote. But in those
same areas, the political party of the president who appointed the other two judges on the
panel is at least as good a predictor of how individual judges will vote.  All in all,
                                                 
5 We use this phrase throughout for the purpose of simplicity. Of course, no sensible stereotype predicts
that Republican appointees will always vote against sex discrimination plaintiffs or in favor of challenges
to affirmative action programs.
4Democratic appointees show somewhat greater susceptibility to panel effects than do
Republican appointees.
But there are noteworthy counterexamples. In three important areas, ideology does
not predict judicial votes, and hence all three hypotheses are refuted. This is the pattern in
criminal appeals, takings claims, and commerce clause challenges to congressional
enactments. And in two areas, the first hypothesis is supported, but the second and third
hypotheses are refuted. These two areas are abortion and capital punishment. In these
areas, judges apparently vote their convictions, and are not affected by panel
composition.
We offer a number of other findings.  We show that variation in panel composition
leads to dramatically different outcomes, in a way that creates serious problem for the
rule of law. In the cases we analyze, a panel composed of three Democratic appointees
issues a liberal ruling 61% of the time, whereas a panel composed of three Republican
appointees issues a liberal ruling only 34% of the time. A panel composed of two
Republican appointees and one Democrat issues a liberal ruling 39% of the time; a panel
composed of two Democratic appointees and one Republican does so 50% of the time.
These differences do not show that the likely result is foreordained by the composition of
the panel. But the plaintiff’s chances, in the cases we examine, are much affected by the
luck of the draw. One of the noteworthy points about these numbers is that a Democratic
majority, or a Republican majority, has the votes to do what it wishes. Apparently a large
disciplining effect comes from the presence of a single panelist from another party.
Hence all-Republican panels show far more conservative patterns than majority
Republican panels, and all-Democratic panels show far more liberal patterns than
majority Democratic panels.
 Disaggregating our data, we provide evidence of how ideology varies by circuit,
showing that the Ninth and Second Circuits are the most liberal, while the Fifth and
Seventh are the most conservative. We also find striking similarities across circuits.  In
all circuits, Democratic appointees are more likely than Republican appointees to vote in
a stereotypically liberal direction, and both party and panel effects are present.  But in
every circuit, in terms of likely vote, a judge’s party makes no more difference than
whether a judge is accompanied by two Democratic appointees or two Republican
appointees.
Our main goal in this essay is simply to present and to analyze the data – to show
the extent to which the three hypotheses find vindication.6 But we also aim to give some
explanation for our findings and to relate them to some continuing debates about the role
of ideology on federal panels. Our data do not reveal whether ideological dampening is a
product of persuasion or a form of collegiality. If Republican appointees show a liberal
pattern of votes when accompanied by two Democratic appointees, it might be because
they are convinced by their colleagues. Alternatively, they might suppress their private
                                                 
6 Some of the findings here are previewed, without statistical analysis, in Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies
Need Dissent (2003).
5doubts and accept the majority’s view. In any case, it is reasonable to say that the data
show the pervasiveness of the collegial concurrence: a concurrence by a judge who signs
the panel’s opinion either because he is persuaded by the shared opinion of the two other
judges on the panel or because it is not worthwhile, all things considered, to dissent. The
collegial concurrence can be taken as an example, in the unlikely setting of judicial
panels, of responsiveness to conformity pressures.7 These pressures make it more likely
that people will end up silencing themselves, or even publicly agreeing with a majority
position, simply because they would otherwise be isolated in their disagreement.
We also find evidence within the federal judiciary of group polarization, by which
like-minded people end up in a more extreme position in accordance with their
predeliberation views.8 If all-Republican panels are overwhelmingly likely to strike down
campaign finance regulation, and if all-Democratic panels are overwhelmingly likely to
uphold affirmative action programs, group polarization is likely to be a reason. Finally,
we offer indirect evidence of a whistleblower effect: A single judge from another party,
while likely to be affected by the fact that he is isolated, might also influence other judges
on the panel, at least where the panel would otherwise fail to follow existing law.9
We believe that our findings are of considerable interest in themselves. They also
reveal much about human behavior in many contexts. A great deal of social science
evidence shows conformity effects: When people are confronted with the views of
unanimous others, they tend to yield.10  Sometimes they yield because they believe that
unanimous others cannot be wrong; sometimes they yield because it is not worthwhile to
dissent in public.11 A great deal of social science evidence also shows that like-minded
people tend to go to extremes.12 In the real world, this hypothesis is extremely hard to test
in light of the range of confounding variables. But our data provide strong evidence that
judges who are like-minded also go to extremes, in the sense that the probability that a
judge will vote in one or another direction is increased by the presence of judges
appointed by the president of the same political party. In short, we claim to show both
strong conformity effects and group polarization within federal courts of appeals. If these
effects can be shown there, then they are likely to be found in many diverse contexts.
In fact, the presence of such effects raises doubts about what is probably the most
influential method for explaining judicial voting: the “attitudinal model.”13 According to
the attitudinal model, judges have certain “attitudes” toward areas of the law, and these
                                                 
7 See the overview in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal
13 (Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).
8 See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 1139 (2001); Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
Societies Need Dissent (2003).
9 See Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 Yale
L.J. 2155 (1998).
10 See id.
11 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66 (1999).
12 Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition 203-226 (1985).
13 See Jeffrey Segal and James Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002).
6attitudes are good predictors of judicial votes in difficult cases.14 Insofar as party effects
are present, our findings are broadly supportive of this idea. But the attitudinal model
does not come to terms with panel effects, which can both dampen and amplify the
tendencies to which judicial “attitudes” give rise. Since panel effects are generally as
large as party effects, and sometimes even larger, the attitudinal model misses a crucial
factor behind judicial votes.
A disclaimer: We have collected a great deal of data, but our subtitle – a
preliminary investigation – should be taken very seriously. The federal reporters offer an
astonishingly large data set about judicial votes, including over two hundred years of
votes ranging over countless substantive areas. Our own investigation is limited to
several areas that, by general agreement, are ideologically contested, so much so as to
produce possible disagreements in the cases that find their way to the courts of appeals.15
Of course it would be extremely interesting to know much more.16 Might ideological
voting and panel effects be found in apparently nonideological cases, involving, for
example, bankruptcy, torts, and civil procedure? What about the important areas of
antitrust and labor law? How do the three hypotheses fare in the early part of the
twentieth century, when federal courts were confronting the regulatory state? In cases
involving minimum wage and maximum hour laws, did Republican appointees differ
from Democratic appointees, and were panel effects also significant? Do the hypotheses
hold in the segregation cases of the 1960s and 1970s? In the fullness of time, it should be
possible to use the techniques discussed here to test a wide range of hypothesis about
judicial voting patterns. One of our central goals is to provide a method for future
analysis, a method that can be used in countless contexts.
                                                 
14 See id. We oversimplify a complex account.
15 Note that the disciplining effect of existing law will be most constraining in disputes that never find their
way to litigation; in such cases, everyone agrees what the law is, and it is not worthwhile to test that
question. In disputes that are not litigated, it is safe to say that Republican appointees and Democratic
appointees would agree almost all of the time. The doctrine should be expected to impose less discipline in
cases that go to trial but that are not appealed; the decision to appeal suggests a degree of indeterminacy.
Hence we are considering cases that are not only contested ideologically, but that also involve a sufficient
lack of clarity in the law as to make it worthwhile to challenge a lower court ruling. Of course the highest
degree of indeterminacy can be found in cases that are litigated to the Supreme Court. In the areas in which
we find no effects from ideology – criminal appeals, takings, and federalism – such effects may nonetheless
be found at the Supreme Court level.
16 There is a sparse literature on panel effects. See Donald Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual
Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals, 26 Amer. J. of Pol. Sci. 225-239
(1982); Burton Atkins and Justin Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or
Reality? 20 Amer. J. of Pol. Sci.735-748 (1976); Burton Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies in a
Three Member Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54 Social
Science Quarterly 41 (1973); Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1968 Wisconsin Law Review 461-482. We have found especially valuable Cross and Tiller,
supra, and Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev.
1717 (1997). On partisan voting, see id.; see also Donald Songer et al., Continuity and Change on the
United States Courts of Appeals (2000); Davin Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals
(2002). A helpful overview of party effects is Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in
American Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 Justice System J. 219 (1999).
7This essay is organized as follows. Part II offers the basic data, testing the three
hypotheses in a number of areas. Part III disaggregates the data by exploring circuit
results. Part IV speculates about the reasons for the various findings, with special
attention to collegial concurrences, group polarization, and whistleblower effects. Part V
investigates some normative issues.
II. The Three Hypotheses
A. Aggregate Data
We examined a total of 4,488 published panel decisions, and the 13,464
associated individual judge’s votes, in the areas of abortion,17 capital punishment,18
Americans with Disabilities Act,19 criminal appeals,20 takings,21 contracts clause,22
affirmative action,23 Title VII race discrimination cases brought by African-American
                                                 
17 We assembled this sample of abortion cases by searching Lexis for “core-terms (abortion) and date aft
1982 and constitutional” and “abortion and constitution!”.  These cases generally presented challenges to
statutes and policies that would infringe on a woman’s right to choose, or challenges to the constitutionality
of anti-protesting injunctions.  Because plaintiffs differed between the cases, outcomes were coded as pro-
life or pro-choice; if a judge voted at all to support the pro-life position then it was counted as a pro-life
vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/82 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 101 cases.
18 We assembled this sample of capital punishment cases by searching Lexis for “capital punishment.” If a
judge voted to grant the defendant any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-defendant vote. The sample
includes cases from 01/01/95 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 181 cases.
19 We assembled this sample of disability cases by searching Lexis for “Americans with Disabilities Act.”
If a judge voted to grant the plaintiff any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample
includes cases from 01/01/98 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 682 cases.
20 We assembled this sample of criminal cases from the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the Fourth
Circuit by searching http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/cadc.cfm,
http://vls.law.vill.edu/Locator/3/, and http://www.law.emory.edu/4circuit/2nd-idx.html, for cases with
“United States” in title.  Government appeals and civil disputes were disregarded.  If a judge voted to grant
the defendant any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-defendant vote. The sample includes cases from
01/01/95 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 1176 cases.
21 We assembled this sample of takings cases by shepardizing on Lexis Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); and Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). If a judge voted to grant the party alleging a violation of the takings
clause any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote.  The sample includes cases from 06/26/78
– 12/31/02. We identified a total of 215 cases.
22 We assembled this sample of contracts clause cases by shepardizing on Lexis Allied Structural Steel Co.
v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), and U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). If a
judge voted to grant the party alleging a violation of the contracts clause any relief, then the vote was coded
as a pro-plaintiff vote.  The sample includes cases from 04/27/77 – 12/31/02.  We identified a total of 76
cases.
23 We assembled this sample of affirmative action cases by searching Lexis for “affirmative action and
constitution or constitutional.”  The sample also includes cases found through a Westlaw Key Cite of
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).  If a judge voted any part of an affirmative action plan unconstitutional, then the vote was
considered a vote for the party challenging the plan. The sample includes cases from 06/28/78 – 12/31/02.
We identified a total of 155 cases.
8plaintiffs,24 sex discrimination,25 campaign finance,26 sexual harassment,27 cases in which
plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil,28 industry challenges to environmental
regulations,29 and federalism challenges to congressional enactments under the commerce
clause.30 Our methods for finding and assessing these cases, described in the footnotes,
leave room for errors and for a degree of discretion.  However, we are confident that the
basic pattern of our results is sound. To keep the inquiry manageable, our investigation is
limited to recent time periods (sometimes from 1995 to the present, though sometimes
longer, certainly when necessary to produce a sufficient number of cases in a particular
category31). We believe that limited though the evidence is, our results are sufficient to
show the range of likely patterns, and also to establish the claim that the three principal
hypotheses are often vindicated.
Our sample is limited to published opinions. This limitation obviously simplifies
research, but it also follows from our basic goal, which is to test the role of ideology in
difficult cases rather than easy ones. As a general rule, unpublished opinions are widely
agreed to be simple and straightforward, and to involve no difficult or complex issues of
law. To be sure, publication practices are not uniform across circuits, and hence the
decision to focus on published cases complicates cross-circuit comparisons. But that
decision enables us to test our hypotheses in the cases that most interest us (and the
                                                 
24 We assembled this sample of Title VII cases by searching Lexis for “Title VII and African-American or
black.”  We included cases that presented a challenge by an African-American plaintiff.  If a judge voted to
grant the plaintiff any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases
from 01/01/85 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 320 cases.
25 We assembled this sample of sex discrimination cases by searching Lexis for “sex! discrimination or sex!
harassment.”  If the plaintiff was afforded any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The
sample includes cases from 01/01/95 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 1007 cases.
26 We assembled this sample of campaign finance cases by shepardizing on Lexis Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). If the party challenging the campaign finance provision was afforded any relief, then the
vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote.  The sample includes cases from 01/30/76 – 12/31/02. We identified
a total of 55 cases.
27 We assembled this sample of sexual harassment cases by searching Lexis for “sex! harassment.”  If the
plaintiff was afforded any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases
from 01/01/95 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 470 cases.
28 We assembled this sample of piercing the corporate veil cases by searching Lexis for “pierc! and
corporate veil.” If a judge afforded the plaintiff trying to pierce the veil any relief, then the vote was coded
as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/95 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 106
cases.
29 We assembled this sample of EPA cases by searching
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/cadc.cfm for cases with “EPA” or the EPA Administrator’s
name in the case title.  We crosschecked this set of cases with results from a Lexis search of “EPA” and
“Environmental Protection Agency.” If a judge voted to afford the industry challenger any relief, then the
vote was coded as a pro-industry vote. The sample includes cases from 09/19/94 – 12/31/02.   For cases
before 1994, we relied on Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997). We identified a total of 142 cases.
30 We assembled this sample of commerce clause cases by shepardizing on Lexis U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995). If the plaintiff was afforded any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The
sample includes cases from 4/26/95 – 12/31/02. We identified a total of 272 cases.
31 Thus we extended the view screen to earlier cases when the post-1995 sample was small. In deciding
how far to look, we typically relied on starting dates marked by important Supreme Court decisions that
would predictably be cited in relevant cases.
9public), while also producing at least considerable information about the role of party and
panel effects across circuits.32
                                                 
32 Because unpublished opinions involve easy cases, we would not expect to see significant party or panel
effects there, and a full sample of court of appeals opinions, including unpublished ones, would of course
show reduced effects of both party and ideology. We emphasize that our goal is to see explore those effects
in hard cases, not easy ones, and hence their absence from easy cases is essentially uninteresting.
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Table 1. Summary of Votes by Individual Judges and Majority Decisions
of Three-Judge Panels
(proportion voting for the liberal position on the given issue)
Table 1 shows the percentage of stereotypically liberal votes33 in a variety of
areas, for individual votes, and for the majority decisions of three-judge panels.  Note
first that in a number of areas, there is strong evidence of ideological voting, in the sense
that Democratic appointees are more likely to vote in the stereotypically liberal direction
than are Republican appointees. We measure ideological voting by subtracting the
percentage of liberal Republican votes from the percentage of liberal Democratic votes;
the larger the number, the larger the party effect. The overall difference is 13% –  not
huge, but substantial. The extent of this effect, and even its existence, is variable across
areas. We shall discuss these variations shortly.
We can also see that the votes of judges are influenced by the party affiliation of
the other two judges on the same panel.  We measure this influence by subtracting the
overall percentage of liberal votes by a judge when sitting with two Democratic
appointees from the percentage when they sit with two Republican appointees.
Surprisingly, this overall difference, 14%, is as large as the basic difference between
parties.
                                                 
33For simplicity of analysis and clarity of presentation we coded votes for all case types in the same
ideological direction. Identical results would come using conservative votes, but with the sign reversed.
 Case Type R D D - R RR RD DD
DD - 
RR
RRR RRD RDD DDD
DDD - 
RRR
 Campaign finance (vote to uphold) .28 .46 .18 .29 .34 .53 .24 .23 .30 .35 .80 .57
 Affirmative action (vote for) .48 .74 .26 .47 .62 .73 .26 .37 .50 .83 .85 .48
 EPA (vote against industry) .46 .64 .18 .48 .54 .66 .19 .27 .55 .62 .72 .45
 Sex discrimination (vote for Plaintiff) .35 .51 .16 .36 .41 .57 .21 .31 .38 .49 .75 .44
 Contracts (reject const challenge) .24 .30 .06 .19 .26 .45 .26 .16 .26 .32 .50 .34
 Pierce corp veil (vote to pierce) .27 .41 .14 .25 .31 .51 .26 .23 .29 .37 .56 .33
 ADA  (vote for Plaintiff) .26 .43 .17 .24 .35 .45 .21 .18 .27 .47 .50 .32
 Abortion (vote pro-choice) .49 .70 .21 .58 .55 .65 .07 .53 .51 .62 .78 .25
 Capital punishment (vote against) .20 .42 .22 .29 .29 .30 .01 .18 .22 .38 .33 .15
 Title VII cases (vote for Plaintiff) .35 .41 .06 .39 .35 .42 .04 .43 .31 .45 .56 .13
 Federalism (vote to uphold) .95 .99 .04 .96 .97 .97 .01 .97 1.00 .98 1.00 .03
 Criminal (vote for Defendant) .33 .36 .03 .33 .33 .33 .00 .31 .31 .40 .34 .02
 Takings clause (find no taking) .23 .20 -.03 .23 .20 .23 .00 .26 .17 .24 .25 -.01
 Average across all case types .38 .51 .13 .39 .43 .52 .14 .34 .39 .50 .61 .27
Case types with a panel difference .34 .50 .16 .35 .40 .53 .17 .29 .36 .49 .64 .35
Individual Judges' Votes Panel Majority Decisions
 Party Panel Colleagues Panel Composition
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Figure 1. Party and Panel Influences on Votes of Individual Judges
(on average for ideological case types)
Finally, it is clear that these two influences result in actual decisions that are very
much affected by the composition of the panel. The clearest point is a sharp spread
between the average outcome in an all-Republican panel and that in all-Democratic
panel. Indeed, the likelihood of a liberal outcome is twice as high with the latter as with
the former. For litigants in highly controversial areas, a great deal depends on the luck of
the draw – the outcome of a random assignment of judges.  
Figure 1 captures the aggregate party and panel effects across those areas in
which there is ideological voting.34 The most striking lessons of this figure are our
principal themes here.35 For both Democratic appointees and Republican appointees, the
likelihood of a liberal vote jumps when the two other panel members are Democratic
                                                 
34 We exempt cases in which there is little or no ideological voting (criminal cases, takings cases, and
federalism cases). If those cases were included, then we would see the same overall patterns, but in
diminished form. If we exempted cases of ideological voting without panel effects (abortion, capital
punishment), the aggregate panel effects would of course be more pronounced.
35 The data were analyzed using a logistic regression model with the vote (liberal/conservative) of an
individual judge on a given case as the dependent variable.  The independent variables were the judge’s
Party (Democrat/Republican appointee), the number of Democrat appointees among the other two judges
on the Panel, and dummy variables for Case Category and Circuit.  Results for this overall model appear in
the Appendix.  For analyses of individual case categories, the model is the same but with case category
dummies dropped; for analyses of circuits the circuit dummies are dropped.  In the aggregate analysis of
Figure 1 the coefficients for Party (p < .001) and Panel (p < .001) are both highly significant. There is also
a slight tendency for Democratic appointees to show larger panel effects that Republican appointees (the
interaction term is marginally significant, p < .07).
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appointees, and it drops when the two other panel members are Republican appointees.
For purposes of discussion, we might take, as the baseline, cases in which a judge is
sitting with one Democrat and one Republican, and compare how voting patterns shift
when a judge is sitting instead with two Democratic appointees or two Republican
appointees. We can readily see that a Democrat, in the baseline condition, casts a liberal
vote 60% of the time, whereas a Republican does so 46% of the time. Sitting with two
Democratic appointees, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes 66% of the time,
whereas Republican appointees do so 54% of the time. Sitting with two Republican
appointees, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes 53% of the time, whereas
Republican appointees do so only 34% of the time. Thus Republican appointees, sitting
with two Democratic appointees, show the same basic pattern of votes as do Democratic
appointees, sitting with two Republican appointees.
But the aggregate figures conceal some significant differences across case
categories. We begin with cases in which all three hypotheses are supported, and then
turn to cases in which they are not.
B. All Hypotheses Supported
Affirmative action.  Let us start with affirmative action, which shows the basic
pattern of results as in the aggregate data (Figure 2).36 From 1980 through 2002,
Republican appointees cast 267 total votes, with 127, or 48%, in favor of upholding an
affirmative action policy. By contrast, Democratic appointees cast 198 votes, with 147, or
74%, in favor of upholding an affirmative action policy. Here we find striking evidence
of ideological voting. But we also find significant evidence of panel effects. An isolated
Democrat, sitting with two Republican appointees, votes for affirmative action only 61%
of the time – halfway between the aggregate numbers for Democratic appointees and
Republican appointees. More remarkably, isolated Democratic appointees are actually
slightly less likely to vote for affirmative action programs than are isolated Republican
appointees, who vote in favor 65% of the time. Thus we see strong evidence of
ideological dampening.
The third hypothesis is also confirmed. On all-Republican panels, individual
Republican appointees vote for affirmative action programs 37% of the time, as
compared with 49% when Republican appointees hold a two-to-one majority. On all-
Democratic panels, individual Democratic appointees vote in favor of the plan 82% of the
time, compared to 80% with a two-judge Democratic majority. An institution defending
an affirmative action program has about a one-in-three chance of success before an all-
Republican panel – but more than a four-in-five chance before an all-Democratic panel!
In a pattern that captures many of the doctrinal areas, the rate of pro-affirmative action
votes on all-Democratic panels is almost triple the corresponding rate of Republican
votes on all-Republican panels.
                                                 
36 The coefficients for Party (p < .001) and Panel (p < .001) are both significant.
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Figure 2. Voting Patterns for Case Types with Both Party and Colleague Effects
(n (red) = Republican appointees, n (blue) = Democratic appointees)
Sex discrimination. In sex discrimination cases from 1995 to the present,
Republican appointees voted in favor of plaintiffs 35% to the time, whereas Democratic
appointees voted for plaintiffs 51% of the time. Hence we find strong ideological voting,
though not as strong as in the affirmative action context.37 When in the minority,
Republican appointees vote in favor of sex discrimination plaintiffs 42% of the time,
identical to the 42% rate of Democratic appointees when they are in the minority. The
most striking number here is the percentage of pro-plaintiff votes when Democratic
appointees are sitting together. Here 75% of Democratic votes favor plaintiffs, far higher
than the rates of 50% or less when Democratic appointees sit with one or more
Republican appointees. On all-Republican panels, Republican appointees vote at a
strongly anti-plaintiff rate, with only 31% favoring plaintiffs, although this rate increases
steadily with each Democrat on a panel.
                                                 
37  The coefficients for Party (p < .001) and Panel (p < .001) are both significant.
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Sexual harassment. Sexual harassment cases are a subset of sex discrimination
cases; for that reason, they have not been included as a separate entry in our aggregate
figures. But because the area is of considerable independent interest, we have conducted
a separate analysis of sexual harassment cases.38 Republican appointees vote in favor of
plaintiffs at a rate of 37%, whereas Democratic appointees vote for plaintiffs at a rate of
52%. Sitting with two Democratic appointees, Republican appointees are more likely to
vote for plaintiffs than Democratic appointees sitting with two Republican appointees, by
a margin of 44% to 41%. On all-Democratic panels, Democratic appointees vote for
plaintiffs at a 76% rate, more than double the 32% rate of Republican appointees on all-
Republican panels. It might be expected that gender would be relevant to rulings in
sexual harassment cases, and for this reason we did a separate analysis of whether gender
predicts likely votes. The answer is that gender does not matter. Female judges are not
more likely than male judges to vote in favor of plaintiffs in these cases, and judges who
sit with one or more female judge are not more likely to vote for plaintiffs than those who
sit only with male judges. The party of the appointing president, not gender, is the
important variable here.
Disability. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, judges of both parties are
influenced by the colleagues with whom they sit on a panel.39 In data collected for the
period from 1998 to 2002,40 Republican appointees vote 26% of the time in favor of
plaintiffs; sitting with one Republican and one Democrat, the rate is 25%, about the same
as the aggregate figure. But when sitting with two Republican appointees, the rate drops
to 18%, and when sitting with two Democratic appointees, it jumps to 42%. Democratic
percentages move in the same directions, though with a slightly different pattern. The
overall pro-plaintiff vote is 43%, but it is 32% when a Democratic appointee sits with two
Republican appointees (significantly lower than the 42% rate for Republican appointees
sitting with two Democratic appointees), and it rises to 48% with one other Democrat and
to 50% on all-Democratic panels.
Piercing the corporate veil.  Cases in which plaintiffs attempt to pierce the
corporate veil follow a very similar pattern to that for sexual discrimination, with all three
hypotheses confirmed.41 Republican appointees accept such claims at a significantly
lower rate than Democratic appointees: 27% as opposed to 41%. But here as elsewhere, a
Republican, sitting with two Democratic appointees (37% in favor of veil-piercing), is
more liberal than a Democrat, sitting with two Republican appointees (29%). The most
extreme figures in the data involve unified panels. Here too the pro-plaintiff voting
percentage of Democratic appointees, on all Democratic-panels, is almost triple the
corresponding number for Republican appointees, on all-Republican panels: 67% as
opposed to 23%.
                                                 
38  The coefficients for Party (p < .001) and Panel (p < .001) are both significant.
39  The coefficients for Party (p < .001) and Panel (p < .001) are both significant.
40 The sample is very large here, so we thought it unnecessary to collect earlier data to test our three
hypotheses.
41  The coefficients for Party (p < .01) and Panel (p < .001) are both significant.
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Campaign finance.  In cases since 1976, Republican appointees cast only 28% of
their votes in favor of upholding campaign finance laws, substantially lower than the 46%
rate for Democratic appointees. Hence the first hypothesis – ideological voting – is
tentatively supported.42 With respect to the second hypothesis, involving ideological
dampening, the results are suggestive as well. When sitting with two Democratic
appointees, Republican appointees voted to uphold campaign finance laws 35% of the
time. And when sitting with two Republican appointees, Democratic appointees voted for
such programs 40% of the time.
Now turn to the third hypothesis, involving ideological amplification. On all-
Republican panels, Republican appointees voted to uphold 23% of the time, while on all-
Democratic panels, Democratic appointees voted to uphold 73% of the time. The
corresponding numbers, on two-judge majority panels, are 30% and 38% respectively.
Thus there is evidence of a substantial difference between the behavior of all-Democratic
panels and Democratic majority panels; but the same is not true for Republican
appointees.
Environmental regulation. A large data set, much of it compiled and explored by
Dean Revesz,43 comes from industry challenges to EPA regulations. We have added a
great deal to Revesz’s data set here,44 though like Revesz, we limit our findings to the
D.C. Circuit, which hears the vast majority of environmental cases.45 From 1970 through
2002, Democratic appointees voted against agency challenges 64% of the time, whereas
Republican appointees did so 46% of the time.46 There are also significant findings of
group influence.47 Republican appointees show ideological amplification. On all-
Republican panels, Republican appointees vote against industry challenges just 27% of
the time; but for members of two-Republican majorities this figure rises rapidly to 50%,
and finally to 63% for a single minority Republican.
Interestingly, Democratic appointees do not show ideological amplification in this
domain. A single Democratic appointee, accompanied by two Republican appointees,
votes against industry challenges 63% of the time; but when joined by two Democratic
appointees, the rate rises only to 72%. Their invalidation rates are largely impervious to
panel effects. But as Dean Revesz has shown, ideological amplification can be found
among Democratic appointees when an environmental group is challenging agency
                                                 
42 Here we are hampered by the small number of campaign finance cases available. The coefficient for
Party almost achieves significance (p = .13) and the Panel coefficient is positive but not significantly
different from zero (p = .35). We include campaign finance cases in this group of case categories because it
has a matching pattern that would be highly significant, given a larger number of cases.
43 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717
(1997).
44 See id.
45  The coefficients for Party (p < .001) and Panel (p < .001) are both significant.
46 Using a smaller data set than that used here, Revesz finds that when industry challenges an
environmental regulation, there is an extraordinary difference between the behavior of a Republican
majority and that of a Democratic majority. Republican majorities reverse agencies over 50% of the time;
Democratic majorities do so less than 15% of the time. Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the
D.C. Circuit, 85 Va. L. Rev. 805, 808 (1999).
47 See id. at 808 (1999).
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action. A panel of three Democratic appointees is more likely to accept the challenge than
a panel of two Democratic appointees and one Republican.48 The likelihood that a
Democrat will vote in favor of an environmentalist challenge is highest when three
Democratic appointees are on the panel – and lowest when the panel has two Republican
appointees.49
Contracts clause violations. We examined contracts clause cases with the thought
that Republican appointees would be more sympathetic than Democratic appointees to
contracts clause claims. Our speculation to this effect was rooted in the fact that
conservative academics have argued for stronger judicial protection of contractual
rights.50 But our speculation turned out to be wrong. There is mild evidence of
ideological voting with respect to the contracts clause, but it runs in the opposite direction
from what we predicted, apparently because those who make contracts clause objections
are more sympathetic to Democratic than to Republican appointees.51
In cases from 1995 to the present, Republican appointees vote on behalf of
plaintiffs 24% of the time, whereas Democratic appointees do so 30% of the time. More
striking in this context are the panel effects, which are large for both parties. On all-
Democratic panels, Democratic appointees vote in favor of plaintiffs 50% of the time; on
all-Republican panels, Republican appointees vote in favor of plaintiffs only 16% of the
time. But the dampening effects are large and in the predicted direction. Sitting with two
Democratic appointees, Republican appointees vote in favor of plaintiffs in 42% of the
cases, whereas a Democrat sitting with two Republican appointees does so just 24% of
the time.
Title VII.  In cases brought under Title VII by African-American plaintiffs, we
find small but nearly statistically significant evidence of ideological voting: Democratic
appointees vote for plaintiffs 41% of the time, whereas Republican appointees do so 35%
of the time.52 Democratic appointees also show ideological dampening, with a 33% pro-
plaintiff vote when sitting with two Republican appointees, and ideological amplification,
with a 54% pro-plaintiff vote when sitting with two Democratic appointees. The pattern
for Republican appointees is a bit of a puzzle. When sitting with two Republican
appointees, Republican appointees actually vote for plaintiffs at a higher rate – 43% –
than when sitting with one or more Democratic appointees. When sitting with two
Democratic appointees, Republican appointees vote for plaintiffs at a 35% rate, slightly
higher than the 30% rate shown when sitting with one Democrat and one Republican.
Overall, this is a similar pattern to others with both party and colleague effects, except for
                                                 
48 Id. at 1753.
49 Id.
50 See Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 704-05
(1984).
51  The coefficient for Party is not significantly different from zero (p > .30) but the Panel coefficient is
significant (p < .01). We include contracts clause cases here because of the panel effect.
52  Neither the coefficient for Party (p = .18) nor that for Panel (p > .30) is significantly different from zero.
We include Title VII cases here because expect for the anomalous pattern for all-Republican panels, the
remainder of the pattern looks similar to the rest of this groups of case categories.  Indeed, if we drop the
RRR group, both Party and Panel effects are significant.
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the apparently anomalous voting of all-Republican panels, for which we have no good
explanation.
C. All Hypotheses Rebutted
In three areas, all of our hypotheses were rebutted (Figure 3). The simple reason is
that there is no significant difference between the votes of Republican appointees and
those of Democratic appointees. Contrary to expectations, the political affiliation of the
appointing President does not matter in the contexts of criminal appeals, federalism, and
takings.
Figure 3. Voting Patterns for Case Types with Neither Party nor Colleague Effects
(n (red) = Republican appointees, n (blue) = Democratic appointees)
Criminal Appeals. It might be anticipated that Democratic appointees would be
especially sympathetic to criminal defendants and that Republican appointees would be
relatively unsympathetic. At least this is a popular platitude about judicial behavior.
Hence the three hypotheses might be anticipated to receive strong support. But all of
them are rejected, at least in three courts of appeals from 1995 to the present.53 We
selected the courts of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and for the Third and
Fourth Circuits, on the theory that we would be highly likely to find ideological voting in
criminal cases in these circuits. However, we found no such effects. The overall rate of
votes for defendants is between 30% and 39%, with no significant differences between
Republican appointees and Democratic appointees, and without significant panel effects.
We conclude that Republican appointees and Democratic appointees do not much differ
in this domain; we attempt to explain this finding below.
Federalism and the commerce clause. Since 1995, the overwhelming majority of
federal judicial votes have been in favor of the constitutionality of programs challenged
under the commerce clause. Indeed, Democratic appointees vote to validate the
challenged program over 99% of the time. The numbers are not materially different for
                                                 
53 Neither the coefficient for Party nor that for Panel is significantly different from zero.
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Republican appointees, for whom the overall validation rate is 95%. No panel effects are
observed.54 A possible reason for the agreement is that for many decades, the Supreme
Court gave a clear signal that courts should be reluctant to invalidate congressional
enactments under the commerce clause.55 To be sure, the Court has given recent signals
about its willingness to invoke that clause against Congress.56 However, neither
Republican nor Democratic appointees seem to believe that those signals should be taken
very seriously. Perhaps things will change in this regard as the lower courts internalize
the Court’s messages.
Takings. When plaintiffs challenge a governmental decision as violative of
property rights, Democratic appointees and Republican appointees again show no
significant differences.57 Only 23% of Republican votes are in favor of such challenges.
It might be expected that Democratic appointees would show a substantially lower level
of invalidation rates, but the percentage of Democratic votes to invalidate is nearly
identical: 20%. No panel effects can be found.
D. Ideological Voting Without Amplification or Dampening: The Unique Cases of
Abortion and Capital Punishment
It would be possible to imagine areas dominated by ideological voting. In such
areas, judges would be expected to vote in a way that reflects the political affiliation of
the appointing president – but panel effects would be minimal. This is the pattern of
outcomes in only two areas that we investigated: abortion and capital punishment (Figure
4).
Figure 4. Voting Patterns for Case Types with Only a Party Effect
(n (red) = Republican appointees, n (blue) = Democratic appointees)
                                                 
54 Neither the coefficient for Party nor that for Panel is significantly different from zero.
55 See Geoffrey Stone et al., Constitutional Law (5th ed. 2001).
56 See United States v. Lopez; Morrison.
57 Neither the coefficient for Party nor that for Panel is significantly different from zero.
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Democratic appointees cast pro-abortion votes 70% of the time, compared to 49%
for Republican appointees.  Here again we find evidence of ideological voting. But panel
effects are absent.  Sitting with two Democratic appointees, Republican appointees vote
in favor of invalidation 53% of the time, not appreciably different from the 48% rate
when sitting with one or more Republican appointees and the 50% invalidation rate in all
Republican panels.  Similarly, sitting with two Republican appointees, Democratic
appointees vote in favor of abortion rights 68% of the time, not much less than the 71%
and 73% rates when sitting with one or two other Democratic appointees, respectively.
The failure of the third hypothesis is even more striking. A Republican vote, on an all-
Republican panel, is essentially the same as on a panel of two Republican appointees and
one Democrat; a Democratic vote, on an all-Democratic panel, is essentially the same as
on a panel of two Democratic appointees and one Republican.
Capital punishment shows a similar pattern: a large party difference, but no other
significant effects. Republican appointees vote for defendants 19% of the time on all-
Republican panels; 19% of the time on majority Republican panels; and 24% of the time
on majority Democratic panels.  Democratic appointees vote for defendants 37% of the
time on all-Democratic panels; 44% of the time on majority Democratic panels; and 40%
of the time on majority Republican panels.
E. Panel Decisions
Thus far we have focused on the votes of individual judges. For litigants and the
law, of course, it is not the votes of individual judges, but the decisions of three-judge
panels, that are of real interest. Let us now turn to panel outcomes.
In terms of the political affiliation of the appointing president, there are four
possible combinations of judges on a three-judge panel: RRR, RRD, RDD, and DDD.
Variations in panel composition can have two important effects, which should now be
distinguished. The first involves the sheer number of people leaning in a certain direction.
Suppose, for example, that Republican appointees are likely to rule in favor of a
particular type of program only 40% of the time, whereas Democratic appointees are
likely to rule in favor of such programs 70% of the time. As a simple statistical matter,
and putting to one side the possibility that judges are influenced by one another, it
follows that the likely majority outcome of a panel will be affected by its composition, so
that (for example) a panel of all-Democratic appointees is far more likely (78%) to
uphold an the program than a panel of two Democratic appointees and one Republican
(66%), while an all-Republican panel would be much less likely to do so (35%).58
                                                 
58 These figures come from the multinomial probabilities of getting at least two votes to uphold (a Yes
vote), given the panel composition.  For a three-judge panel, there are four ways to get a decision to uphold
– votes of YYY, YYN, YNY, and NYY, from judges 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  For example, for an all-
Democratic appointed panel (DDD), the probability of a vote to uphold the program is P(YYY) + P(YYN)
+ P(YNY) + P(NYY) = .7*.7*.7 + .7*.7*(1-.7) + .7*(1-.7)*.7 + (1-.7)*.7*.7 = .343 + .147 + .147 + .147 =
.784, which rounds to 78%; for one Republican and two Democrats (RDD), the calculation is .4*.7*.7 +
.4*.7*(1-.7) + .4*(1-.7)*.7 + (1-.4)*.7*.7 = .196 + .084 + .084 + .294 = .658; and so forth.
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This is an important and substantial difference. But as noted, this statistical effect
assumes that judicial votes are not influenced by judicial colleagues. Suppose that an
individual judge’s likely vote is in fact influenced by the composition of the panel. If so,
then the mere majority force of predispositions, just described, will not tell the full story
of the difference between all-Republican panels and all-Democratic panels. In fact the
statistical account will understate the difference, possibly substantially. To illustrate with
our own data, let us assume for the moment that the average percentages reported in the
bottom row of Table 1 do accurately represent individual voting tendencies for case types
that show differences in panel decisions. Figure 5 compares the predicted percentages,
based on 34% for Republican appointees and 51% for Democratic appointees and using
the calculation above, to the observed averages from the same row of the Table. The
predicted panel effect (DDD% - RRR%) is 24%, but the observed difference is 35%. It is
clear that to explain these results, something must be at work other than majority voting
with different ideological predictions.59
                                                 
59 If the shape of the graph were to hold up, it would suggest that the largest disparities occur when
Democratic appointees are in the majority.  This conclusion is tentative, of course, because of the lack of a
clean or simple measure of the “true” party difference.
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Figure 5. Predicted vs. Actual Panel Decisions
(for case types with a panel difference)
III. Disaggregating by Circuit
There are twelve federal courts of appeals, and it is therefore possible to
disaggregate the cases by circuit, to see whether the effects observed in the aggregate
data hold across the board. In some contexts, the sample is too small to allow for reliable
generalizations. To obtain a sense of what is happening across circuits, we aggregated the
various cases within circuits.60 The simplest finding has to do with ideological variations
across circuits.
Consider Figure 6. In accordance with standard lore, the Ninth and Second
Circuits are two of the most liberal, and the Fifth and Seventh Circuits are two of the
most conservative. The rankings, in terms of ideology, correlate strongly (but not
perfectly) with the percentage of Democratic appointees on the relevant court in 2002 (r =
.59).61 Note that the figure, while suggestive, is a bit crude. In many contexts, litigants
have some discretion about the circuit in which to bring suit, and hence civil rights
                                                 
60 To provide a common basis for comparing the circuits, we analyzed those case types with party
differences, as in Figures 1-4, but also excluded environmental cases, which were only brought in the DC
circuit.
61  Of course, since our cases occurred over many years, an analysis that more carefully matched the year of
the case with the then-current composition of the relevant circuit could show a stronger relationship.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
RRR RRD RDD DDD
Panel Composition
%
 L
ib
e
ra
l 
V
o
te
Predicted Panel
Actual Panel
22
plaintiffs would prefer to sue in the Ninth Circuit rather than the Seventh. But broadly
speaking, the figure probably captures ideological differences across circuits.
Figure 6. Circuit Composition and Individual Voting Patterns
(sorted by % of liberal votes)
Now turn to another question: Whether the effects of party and panel differ across
circuits. As before, to obtain a measure of party effects, we subtract the percentage of
liberal votes by Republican appointees from the percentage of liberal votes by
Democratic appointees; this is a good test for whether party predicts likely votes.
Similarly, to create our measure of panel effects, we subtract the percentage of liberal
votes by judges (whether Republican or Democrat) sitting with two Republican
appointees from the percentage of such votes of judges sitting with two Democratic
appointees.  Figure 7 presents the results.  There are party differences in all circuits,
although they do differ in magnitude.  The 3rd, 5th and 7th circuits show small party
differences (less than 8%), followed by a group of eight circuits with party differences in
the 12%-17% range, followed by the 9th circuit, which shows by far the largest party
difference (27%).  There is also a modest tendency for party differences to be larger as
the ideology of the circuit becomes more liberal (a correlation across circuits of .43
between the percentage of liberal votes and the size of the party difference).  Larger party
differences tend to be accompanied by larger panel differences as well – there is a
correlation of .70 between the sizes of party and panel effects (the 6th circuit, which has a
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large party effect but no panel effect, is the main exception to this pattern).  Further,
panel effects are generally about the same size as party effects (the only exceptions are
the 5th and 6th Circuits), as we saw in our aggregate analysis above.  In the great majority
of circuits, a judge’s vote is predicted as well or better by the political affiliation of the
president who appointed the two other panel members as by the political affiliation of the
president who appointed the judge in question.
Figure 7. Party and Panel Effects on Individual Judges' Votes, by Circuit
(from smallest to largest party difference)
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IV. Explanations
What explains this pattern of outcomes? We sort them into three categories: those
in which all three hypotheses are rejected; those in which party effects are clear, but
unaccompanied by panel effects; and those in which all three hypotheses are confirmed.
A. No Party Effects, No Panel Effects
Consider first the contexts in which all three of our hypotheses are rejected. In
those contexts, Republican and Democratic appointees do not much disagree, and hence
the political party of the appointing judge will not affect outcomes. In many areas,
ideology is undoubtedly irrelevant to judicial votes. For example, we would not expect to
see significant party effects in diversity cases that present routine issues of state law. Our
investigation finds that party is irrelevant in several areas where such effects might be
anticipated (and indeed in which we anticipated them). By informal lore, Republican
appointees and Democratic appointees do disagree in criminal appeals, takings, and
federalism cases. But informal lore is wrong. There are two possible explanations.
The first explanation is that the law is clear and binding, and hence ideological
disagreements cannot materialize. It is plausible to think that in all three areas, the
precedents dampen any differences between Republican and Democratic appointees. At
the court of appeals level, there might well be a sufficient consensus about the doctrine as
to overcome the potential effects of party. Perhaps the disagreements can manifest
themselves only in the “frontiers” cases – the highly unusual situations that find their way
to the Supreme Court itself. This hypothesis finds some support in the commerce clause,
where the small, statistically insignificant difference between Democratic and Republican
appointees seems to come in these “frontiers” cases.
The second possibility is that even if the doctrine does allow courts room to
maneuver, appointees of different parties do not much disagree about the appropriate
principles. Other empirical work suggests that in criminal cases, Clinton appointees do
not differ from Republican appointees.62 A near-consensus appears to exist in this area.
Perhaps the same is true in the contexts of takings and federalism. For criminal appeals,
there is a further point. Unlike in the civil context, criminal defendants will appeal even
when there is no indeterminacy, because (with very rare exceptions) they are not paying
for the appeal. As a result, most criminal appeals lack merit under the prevailing
doctrine.63 Our data do not allow us to decide between the “binding precedent” and
“ideological agreement” accounts. But they do show that in some domains where
Democratic appointees and Republican appointees might be expected to differ, there is
essential agreement.
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B. Party Effects Without Panel Effects
What about the contexts of abortion and capital punishment? Here we find that
party affiliation is what matters, and hence that people will vote their convictions
regardless of the composition of the panel. In these cases, antecedent convictions must be
extremely strong – strong enough to undo the group influences that occur in other types
of cases. It seems clear that judges have strong beliefs about abortion and capital
punishment, issues about which beliefs are often fiercely held. In cases of this kind, it is
natural to assume that votes will be relatively impervious to panel effects.64
The disaggregated data show that for some judges, other areas have similar
characteristics. On the D.C. Circuit, Democratic appointees respond to industry
challenges to environmental regulations in the same way that judges as a whole respond
to abortion and capital punishment cases: Party matters, but panel does not. In general,
Sixth Circuit judges show the same pattern. On the Fifth Circuit, Republican appointees
are unaffected by panel composition. One possibility is that the relevant judges have
strong convictions across a range of cases, convictions that are sufficient to make panel
irrelevant. Another possibility is that judges of the opposing party are particularly
unconvincing. To understand this possibility, it is necessary to explore the reasons for
panel effects.
C. Why Aren’t the Effects Larger?
We have been emphasizing the existence of strong party and panel effects. But
this is only part of the story. Even when party effects are significant, they are not
overwhelmingly large. Recall that Republican appointees cast stereotypical liberal votes
34 percent of the time, whereas Democratic appointees do so 61 percent of the time. Over
one-third of the votes of Democratic appointees are stereotypically conservative, and over
one-third of the votes of Republican appointees are stereotypically liberal. More often
than not, Republican and Democratic appointees agree with one another, even in the most
controversial cases. Why is this?
We think that the answer has three parts. The first consists of panel effects.
Republican appointees often sit with one or more Democratic appointees, and the same is
true for Democratic appointees. If judges are influenced by one another, the random
assignment of judges will inevitably produce some dampening of differences. The second
factor involves the disciplining effect of precedent and law – a factor that might be
labeled “professionalism.” In the context of commerce clause challenges to legislation,
we have explained judicial agreement across party lines partly on the ground that
precedent is seen to dispose of most current disputes. Sometimes precedent will allow
some, but not a great deal of, space for ideological differences to emerge. Undoubtedly
the large measure of agreement is partly a product of the constraints of law itself. In some
areas, those constraints will ensure that Republican and Democratic appointees do not
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disagree. In other areas, they will permit disagreement, but they will discipline its
magnitude.
The third factor involves legal and political culture. For all of their differences,
Democratic and Republican judicial appointees are almost never ideologues or
extremists. If a sex discrimination plaintiff presents a strong claim, Republican
appointees will agree with her, even if the law allows judges to exercise discretion; if an
environmental regulation is plainly arbitrary, Democratic appointees will strike it down
as arbitrary, even if the law would allow them to uphold it. The process of legal training
imposes strong limits on what judges seek to do. In any case the political culture
constrains presidential appointments, ensuring a kind of filtering that will, for the most
part, prevent presidents from nominating (and the Senate from confirming) people whose
views are extreme. The high levels of agreement between Republican and Democratic
appointees are undoubtedly affected by this fact.
D. Why Panel Effects?
In our data, the usual pattern involves not simply party effects but also panel
effects. Indeed, the latter are as large as the former, and sometimes larger. We observe
substantial panel effects in the areas of campaign finance, affirmative action, disability
discrimination, piercing the corporate veil, race discrimination, sexual harassment, sex
discrimination, and judicial review of environmental regulations at the behest of industry
plaintiffs. We suggest that three factors are probably at work.
1. The Collegial Concurrence. In the context of judicial review of environmental
regulations, Dean Revesz’s empirical analysis finds that “while individual ideology and
panel composition both have important effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s
colleagues is a better predictor of one’s vote than one’s own ideology.”65 We have
extended this finding to many domains. But why is “the ideology of one’s colleagues” so
influential? Let us begin by focusing on the difference between how a judge will vote, on
a three-judge panel, if she sits with no colleagues from the same party, and how a judge
will vote if she sits with one or more colleagues from the same party. The simplest
explanation is that much of the time, judges are willing to offer a collegial concurrence.
Two factors are likely to contribute to the collegial concurrence. First, the votes of
one’s colleagues carry some information about what is right. If two colleagues believe
that an affirmative action program is unconstitutional, and no other judge is available to
argue on its behalf, then the exchange of arguments in the room will suggest that the
program is genuinely unconstitutional. Second, dissenting opinions on a three-judge
panel are likely to be both futile and burdensome to produce – a difficult combination.
Most of the time, such dissents will not persuade either of the majority’s judges to switch
his vote. To be sure, such a dissent might, in extreme cases, attract the attention of the
Supreme Court or lead to a rehearing en banc; and when judges dissent, it is partly in the
hope that such an outcome will occur. But Supreme Court review is rare, and courts of
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appeals are most unlikely to rehear cases en banc.66 In any case, it is time-consuming to
write a dissent. If the ultimate decision is not going to be affected, why do the extra
work? There is a further point. Dissenting opinions might also cause a degree of tension
among judges, a particular problem in light of the fact that judges must work together for
many years. According to informal lore, a kind of implicit bargain is struck within many
courts of appeals, in the form of, “I won’t dissent from your opinions if you won’t dissent
from mine, at least not unless the disagreement is very great.” All of these points help
account for the great power of “the ideology of one’s colleagues” in producing judicial
votes.
We can better understand these points if we notice the clear connection between
the collegial concurrence and the behavior of individuals, in experimental settings, when
faced with a unanimous group opinion. A great deal of social science research has shown
that if people are confronted with the unanimous views of others, they tend to yield.67
This finding has been made in the context of both political and legal issues,68 and it
extends to simple issues of fact.69 Sometimes people yield even with respect to the
unambiguous evidence of their own senses. The yielding, a form of collegial
concurrence, occurs partly because of the information suggested by the unanimity of
others; how could shared views be wrong? And it occurs partly because of reputational
pressures; people do not want to stand out on a limb. The evidence here suggests that
judges are vulnerable to similar influences. Note that an understanding of these points
clarifies the failure of the second two hypotheses in the contexts of abortion and capital
punishment. In those contexts, judgments are firmly held, and the firmness of those
judgments is sufficient to outweigh the informational and reputational pressure imposed
by the contrary judgments of panel members.
In fact, an understanding of the relevant processes helps to explain and refine the
leveling effects that we have emphasized. Suppose that a Democratic appointee is sitting
with two Republican appointees, and everyone on the panel knows that the Democratic
appointee might reject an extreme ruling. The anticipation or threat of a dissent, or a
separate opinion, might lead the two Republicans to moderate their decision so as to
ensure unanimity. The collegial concurrence need not show that the isolated Democrat, or
the isolated Republican, is simply going along with her peers. It might well be that the
very presence of a potential dissenter has led to a mutually agreeable opinion; both sides
might have done some yielding. Our data, focused on outcomes, does not enable us to test
this hypothesis rigorously. But the sharp difference between divided and unified panels,
in terms of expected votes, is at least suggestive about the possibly important effect of the
isolated Democrat or Republican. It is to that difference that we now turn.
2. Group Polarization. Why do all-Republican panels, and all-Democratic panels,
behave so distinctively? Why are they different from majority Republican panels and
                                                 
66 Explanation and data to be added.
67 See the overview in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal
13 (Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).
68 See R.S. Crutchfield, Conformity and Character, 10 Am. Psych. 191 (1955).
69 See Asch, supra note.
28
majority Democratic panels? A clue comes from one of the most striking findings in
modern social science, which finds that groups of like-minded people tend to go to
extremes. 70 More particularly, such groups end up taking a more extreme position in the
same direction as their predeliberation tendencies. Outside of the judicial context,
consider a few examples:
n A group of moderately profeminist women will become more strongly
profeminist after discussion.71
n After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States
and its intentions with respect to economic aid.72
n After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more
negative responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for
conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.73
n After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more
positive responses to the same question.74
n Juries inclined to award punitive damages typically produce awards that are
significantly higher than the awards of their median member.75
An understanding of group polarization strongly suggests that in an important
sense, our findings about party and panel effects are understated. We have focused on
votes – on who wins and who loses. We have not focused on opinions, which can be
written narrowly or broadly. Investigation of the substance of the opinions would
obviously be burdensome and involve considerable exercise of discretion. But it is
entirely plausible to speculate that a unified panel is less likely to be moderate than a
divided one – and hence that the extremism of all-Republican and all-Democratic panels
is understated by an investigation that looks only at likely votes. There is much room here
for further analysis.
There have been three main explanations for group polarization, all of which have
been extensively investigated.76
a. Persuasive arguments. The first explanation, emphasizing the role of persuasive
arguments, is based on a common sense intuition: that any individual’s position on an
issue is partly a function of which arguments presented within the group seem
convincing. The choice therefore moves in the direction of the most persuasive position
defended by the group, taken as a collectivity. Because a group whose members are
already inclined to vote in a certain direction will have a disproportionate number of
arguments supporting that same direction, the result of discussion will be to move
individuals further in the direction of their initial inclinations. The key is the existence of
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a limited argument pool, one that is skewed (speaking purely descriptively) in a particular
direction.77
b. Social comparison. The second explanation, involving social comparison,
begins with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group
members, and they want also to perceive themselves favorably. Once they hear what
others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position. The
result is to press the group’s position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce
shifts in individual members.78 People may wish, for example, not to seem too
enthusiastic or too restrained in their enthusiasm for affirmative action, feminism, or an
increase in national defense; hence their views may shift when they see what other group
members think. The result will be group polarization.
c. The role of corroboration. The third explanation begins by noting that people
with extreme views tend to have more confidence that they are right, and that as people
gain confidence, they become more extreme in their beliefs.79 The basic idea here is
simple: Those who lack confidence, and who are unsure what they should think, tend to
moderate their views.  It is for this reason that cautious people, not knowing what to do,
are likely to choose the midpoint between relevant extremes.80 But if other people seem
to share your view, you are likely to become more confident that you are correct – and
hence to move in a more extreme direction. In a wide variety of experimental contexts,
people’s opinions have been shown to become more extreme simply because their view
has been corroborated, and because they have been more confident after learning of the
shared views of others.81
It seems reasonable to speculate that one of our key results – ideological
amplification on all-Republican and all-Democratic panels – reflects group polarization.
When a court consists of a panel of judges with the same basic orientation, the median
view, before deliberation begins, will be significantly different from what it would be
with a panel of diverse judges. The argument pool will be very different as well. For
example, a panel of three Republican appointees, tentatively inclined to invalidate the
action of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will offer a range of arguments in
support of invalidation and relatively few in the other direction – even if the law, properly
interpreted, favors validation. If the panel contains a judge who is inclined to uphold the
EPA, the arguments that favor validation are far more likely to emerge and to be pressed.
Indeed, the very fact that the judge is a Democrat increases the likelihood that this will
occur, since that judge might not think of himself as being part of the same “group” as the
other panel members. And because corroboration of opinion leads to greater confidence
and hence extremity, it is not surprising that deliberation by a panel of three like-minded
judges would lead to unusual and extreme results.
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In this context, the difference in voting patterns on unified and divided panels is
fortified by the possibility that the minority judge, finding himself outnumbered, might
produce a dissenting opinion in public. To be sure, Supreme Court review is rare and in
the general run of cases, the prospect of such review probably does not have much of a
deterrent effect on courts of appeals. But judges who write majority opinions are usually
not enthusiastic about having to see and to respond to dissenting opinions. And if the law
actually favors the dissenting view, two judges, even if they would like to reverse the
Environmental Protection Agency, might be influenced to adopt the easier course of
validation.
At this point a skeptic might note that lawyers make adversarial presentations
before judges. Such a skeptic might insist that the size of the “argument pool” is
determined by those presentations, not only and not even mostly by what members of the
panel are inclined to say and to do. And undoubtedly the inclinations of judges are
shaped, some of the time, by the contributions of advocates. But adversarial presentations
are made before all panel compositions, and so they cannot explain panel effects. In any
case what matters, for purposes of the outcomes, is the inclinations of judges, upon
whatever they are based; and it is here that the existence of a unified rather than divided
panel can make all the difference. Notice in this regard that for the polarization
hypothesis to hold, it is not necessary to know whether judges spend a great deal of time
offering reasons to one another. Mere exposure to a conclusion is enough.82 A system of
simple votes, unaccompanied by reasons, should incline judges to polarize. Of course
reasons, if they are good ones, are likely to make those votes especially persuasive.
3. The Whistleblower Effect. Imagine that existing law is not entirely clear, but
that fairly applied, it requires one or another outcome. It is easily imaginable that like-
minded judges, unaccompanied by a potential dissenter, will fail to apply the law fairly.
This is not because they are essentially lawless. It is because when the law is unclear,
fallible human beings might well be inclined to understand the law in a way that fits with
their predilections.
These points provide a possible explanation for some of the differences between
panels with two-to-one majorities and panels in which all judges were appointed by a
president of the same political party. Consider affirmative action cases. In some of these
cases, three Democratic appointees might well be inclined to vote in favor of validation
even if existing doctrine argues the other way. If no Republican appointee is on the panel,
there is a risk that the panel will unanimously support validation in the face of existing
law. The effect of the Republican is to call the panel’s attention to the tension between its
inclination and the decided cases. Of course her effort may fail. Her copanelists might
persist in their views, perhaps with the claim that those cases can be distinguished. But if
existing law does create serious problems for the panel, the presence of a judge with a
different inclination will have a large effect. We speculate that in the areas in which there
is a large difference between two-to-one majorities and three judges from the same
president, this effect – a whistleblower effect – is playing a role.
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Our data do not allow this speculation to be tested directly. But a separate study
shows the importance of a potential dissenter, or whistleblower, in ensuring that courts
follow the law.83 More particularly, a Democratic appointee, on a court of appeals panel,
turns out to be extremely important in ensuring that such a panel does what the law asks
it to do. The basic point is that diversity of view helps to correct errors – not that judges
of one or another party are likely to be correct.
To understand this study, some background is in order. Under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron v. NRDC,84 courts are supposed to uphold agency
interpretations of law so long as the interpretations are “reasonable.”  But when do courts
actually uphold such interpretations? Existing law allows judges considerable room to
maneuver, so that courts that are inclined to invalidate agency interpretations usually can
find a plausible basis for doing so. The real question is when they will claim to have
found that plausible basis. The relevant study, extending well beyond environmental
protection to regulation in general, confirms the idea that party affiliation has an
exceedingly large influence on outcomes within the D.C. Circuit. If observers were to
code cases very crudely, by taking account of whether industry or a public interest group
is bringing the challenge, they would find that a majority of Republican appointees
reaches a conservative judgment 54% of the time, whereas a majority of Democratic
appointees reaches such a judgment merely 32% of the time.85
For present purposes, the most important finding is the dramatic difference
between politically diverse panels, with judges appointed by Presidents of more than one
party, and politically unified panels, with judges appointed by Presidents of only one
party. On divided panels in which a Republican majority of the court might be expected,
on broadly speaking political grounds, to be hostile to the agency, the court nonetheless
upheld the agency’s interpretation 62% of the time. But on unified panels in which an all-
Republican panel might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upheld the
agency’s interpretation only 33% of the time. Note that this was the only unusual finding
in the data. When Democratic majority courts were expected to uphold the agency’s
decision on political grounds, they did so over 70% of the time, whether unified (71% of
the time) or divided (86% of the time). Consider the results in tabular form86:
RRR
panel
RRD
panel
RDD
panel
DDD
panel
Uphold agency
action 33% 62% 86% 71%
Invalidate
agency action 67% 38% 14% 29%
                                                 
83 Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 Yale L.J.
2155 (1998).
84 See 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
85 Cross and Tiller, supra note, at 2169.
86 Constructed on the basis of data in Cross and Tiller, supra note, at 2172-2173.
32
It is reasonable to speculate that the seemingly bizarre result – a 67% invalidation
rate when Republican appointees are unified! – reflects group influences and, in
particular, group polarization. A group of all-Republican appointees might well take the
relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency’s interpretation. By contrast, a divided
panel, with a built-in check on any tendency toward the unusual or extreme outcome, is
more likely to take the conventional route of simply upholding the agency’s action. An
important reason is that the single Democratic appointee acts as a “whistleblower,”
discouraging the other judges from making a decision that is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s command that courts of appeals should uphold agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes.87
E. A Preliminary Investigation – and Future Directions
We have emphasized that this is a preliminary investigation. It should be possible,
before terribly long, to do what we have done here for multiple domains of the law,
extending over time. The data are readily available and most of the work involves mere
counting. As we have suggested, it would be exceedingly interesting to know whether the
three hypotheses hold in the pre-New Deal tensions between courts and the regulatory
state and in the struggle over school segregation. So, too, it would be valuable to know
whether similar patterns can be found in the legal disputes over slavery, in judicial review
of decisions by the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Communications
Commission, in cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and in cases involving
foreign affairs and war.
We could easily imagine that ideological disagreements, between judges
appointed by presidents of different parties, would be greater or weaker in certain
historical periods. It might be hypothesized, for example, that such disagreements were
weakened in the 1940s, when the nation seemed to form a consensus about the
appropriate role of the federal judiciary. It might also be hypothesized that such
disagreements would be especially strong since 1980, with powerful partisan divisions
about the appropriate role of the federal judiciary. But are these hypotheses correct?
Ultimately it would be desirable to compile an extensive data set about votes on federal
courts of appeals, showing the diverse patterns into which those votes fall.
III. What Should Be Done?
It remains to investigate the normative issues. Is it troubling to find a large effect
from party or from panel composition? Should we be concerned if like-minded judges go
to extremes? Is there reason to attempt to ensure diversity on the federal courts? To
promote a degree of diversity on panels? There is a widespread view that judges
appointed by presidents of different political parties are not fundamentally different and
that, once on the bench, judges frequently surprise those who nominated them.88 The
view is not entirely baseless, but it is misleading. Some appointees do disappoint the
Presidents who nominated them, but these examples are not typical. Judges appointed by
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Republican presidents are quite different from judges appointed by Democratic
presidents. To take evidence from just one area, “[p]artisanship clearly affects how
appellate courts review agency discretion.”89 We have noted that the effects that we find
are large but not massive. Because of the disciplining effect of precedent, and because
judges do not radically disagree with one another, there is significant commonality across
political party. But in the most difficult areas, the ones where the law is unclear or in flux,
both party and panel effects are large enough to be a source of serious concern.
It is difficult to evaluate the underlying issues without taking a stand on the merits
– without knowing what we want judges to do. Suppose that three Republican appointees
are especially likely to strike down affirmative action programs, and that three
Democratic appointees are especially likely to uphold those programs. At first glance,
one or the other inclination is troubling only if we know whether we approve of one or
another set of results. And if a view about what judges should do is the only possible
basis for evaluation, we might conclude that those who prefer judges of a particular party
should seek judges of that party, and that group influences are essentially beside the
point.
But the conclusion is too strong. In some cases, the law, properly interpreted,
really does argue strongly for one or another view. The existence of diversity on a panel
is likely to bring that fact to light and perhaps to move the panel’s decision in the
direction of what the law requires. The existence of politically diverse judges, and of a
potential dissent, increases the probability that the law will be followed. The Chevron
study, referred to above, strongly supports this point.90 The presence of a potential
dissenter – in the form of a judge appointed by a president from another political party –
creates a possible whistleblower who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect or lawless
decision.91 Through an appreciation of the nature of group influences, we can see the
wisdom in an old idea: A decision is more likely to be right, and less likely to be political
in a pejorative sense, if it is supported by judges with different predilections.
There is a further point. Suppose that in many areas, it is not clear, in advance,
whether the appointees of Democratic or Republican presidents are correct. Suppose that
we are genuinely uncertain. If so, then there is reason to favor a situation in which the
legal system has both, simply on the ground that through that route, more reasonable
opinions are likely to be heard. And if we are genuinely uncertain, then there is reason to
favor a mix of views merely by virtue of its moderating effect. In the face of uncertainty,
sensible people choose between the poles.92
Consider an analogy. Independent regulatory commissions, such as the Federal
Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor
Relations Board, and the Federal Communications Commission, often make modern law
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and policy. Much of the time, such agencies act through adjudication. They function in
the same fashion as federal courts. And under federal statutes, Congress has attempted to
ensure that these agencies are not monopolized by either Democratic appointees or
Republican appointees. The law requires that no more than a bare majority of agency
members may be from a single party.93 An understanding of group influences helps to
explain this requirement. An independent agency that is all-Democratic, or all-
Republican, might move toward an extreme position, indeed toward a position that is
more extreme than that of the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more
extreme than that of any agency official standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan
membership can operate as a check against movements of this kind. Congress was
apparently aware of this general point. Closely attuned to the policymaking functions of
the relevant institutions, it was careful to provide a safeguard against extreme
movements.
Why do we fail to create similar safeguards for courts? Part of the answer must lie
in a belief that unlike heads of independent regulatory commissions, judges are not
policymakers. Their duty is to follow the law, not to make policy. An attempt to ensure
bipartisan composition would seem inconsistent with the commitment to this belief. But
the evidence we have discussed shows that judges are policymakers of an important kind,
and that their political commitments very much influence their votes. In principle, there is
good reason to attempt to ensure a mix of perspectives within courts of appeals.
Of course the idea of diversity, or of a mix of perspectives, is hardly self-defining.
It would not be appropriate to say that the federal judiciary should include people who
refuse to obey the Constitution, or who refuse to exercise the power of judicial review, or
who think that the Constitution allows suppression of political dissent and racial
segregation. Here as elsewhere, the domain of appropriate diversity is limited. What is
necessary is reasonable diversity, or diversity of reasonable views, and not diversity as
such. People can certainly disagree about what reasonable diversity entails in this context.
We are suggesting here that there is such a thing as reasonable diversity, and that it is
important to ensure that judges, no less than anyone else, are exposed to it, and not
merely through the arguments of advocates.
These points cast fresh light on a much disputed issue: the legitimate role of the
Senate in giving “advice and consent” to presidential appointments to the federal
judiciary. Above all, an understanding of social influences suggests that the Senate has a
responsibility to exercise its constitutional authority in order to ensure a reasonable
diversity of views. The Constitution’s history fully contemplates an independent role for
the Senate in the selection of Supreme Court Justices.94 That independent role certainly
authorizes the Senate to consider the general approach, and the likely pattern of votes, of
potential judges. There can be no doubt that the President considers the general approach
of his nominees; the Senate is entitled to do so as well. Under good conditions, these
simultaneous powers would bring about a healthy form of checks and balances,
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permitting each branch to counter the other. Indeed, that system is part and parcel of
social deliberation about the direction of the federal judiciary.
Why might this view be rejected? It could be urged that there is only one
legitimate approach to constitutional or statutory interpretation – that, for example, some
version of originalism or textualism is the only such approach, and that anyone who
rejects that view is unreasonable. For true believers, it is pointless to argue for diverse
views.95 Diversity is not necessary, or even valuable, if we already know what should be
done, and if competing views would simply cloud the issue. (In a scientific dispute, it is
not helpful to include those who believe that the earth is flat.) Or it might be urged that a
deferential role for the Senate, combined with natural political competition and cycles,
will produce a sensible mix over time. We do not deny this possibility. Our only
suggestions are that a high degree of diversity on the federal judiciary is desirable, that
the Senate is entitled to pursue diversity, and that without such diversity, judicial panels
are will inevitably go in unjustified directions.
Conclusion
No reasonable person seriously doubts that ideology, understood as normative
commitments of various sorts, helps to explain judicial votes. Presidents are entirely
aware of this point, and their appointment decisions are undertaken with full appreciation
of it. We have found striking evidence of a relationship between the political party of the
appointing president and judicial voting patterns. We have also found that much of the
time, judicial votes are affected by panel composition. In many domains, the voting
patterns of isolated Democratic appointees are close to what would be expected from the
median Republican appointee, just as the voting patterns of an isolated Republican
appointee are akin to what would be expected from the median Democratic appointee. In
many domains, a Democratic appointee is significantly more likely to vote in the
stereotypical liberal fashion if surrounded by two Democratic appointees than if
surrounded by one Republican and one Democrat. So too for Republican appointees,
whose voting patterns are very much influenced by having two, rather than one,
copanelists appointed by a president of the same political party.
Taken as a whole, the data suggest the pervasiveness of three phenomena. The
first is the collegial concurrence: votes to join two colleagues and to refuse to dissent
publicly, notwithstanding an initial disposition to vote the other way and very possibly, a
continuing belief that the decision is incorrect. The second is group polarization: the
tendency, within a group of like-minded people, to move to relative extremes. The third
is a whistleblower effect, by which a single judge, of a different party from the majority,
can have a moderating effect on a judicial panel.
                                                 
95 Note, however, that even if it would be appropriate for all judges to share a certain approach, it is also
desirable to have diversity with respect to the application of that approach. Textualists do not all agree with
one another; there is internal diversity in the world of originalism. Diversity is appropriate here to ensure an
airing of reasonable views.
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It might be surprising to find that in some controversial areas, the political
affiliation of the appointing president is not correlated with judicial votes, and hence that
in those areas, none of these effects can be observed.  This is the basic finding for
criminal appeals, takings, and federalism. But it should not be terribly surprising to see
that in the areas of abortion and capital punishment, judges vote their convictions. Here
the political affiliation of the appointing president is crucial, but panel composition is
otherwise irrelevant. What is perhaps most striking is that in our data set, abortion and
capital punishment are the only areas in which ideology matters but panel composition
does not.
These findings do not have uncontroversial implications for the composition of
panels or of the judiciary as a whole. But if divided panels increase the likelihood of
effective whistleblowing, and if unified panels tend to go to extremes, there is fresh
reason to attempt to ensure a high degree of intellectual diversity within the federal courts
and even within judicial panels. Of course this claim would not hold if the appointees of
one or another party had a monopoly on legal wisdom. In most areas, however, we think
that there is no such monopoly, and that better results are likely to come from a mix of
views and inclinations. However the normative issues are resolved, the empirical findings
are clear. In many domains, Republican appointees vote very differently from
Democratic appointees, and the effects of ideology are both dampened and amplified by
the composition of the panel.
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Appendix: Overall Logistic Regression Results
DV = Liberal vote (0,1)
Predictor Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z|
Party (1 = Democratic appointee) .576 .074 7.81 .000
Other Two (# Democrat appointees) .285 .046 6.19 .000
Party * Other Two .126 .068 1.86 .063
ADA -1.144 .110 -10.41 .000
Abortion -.028 .155 -.18 .859
Campaign Finance -.997 .194 -5.13 .000
Capital Punishment -1.226 .139 -8.82 .000
Contracts -1.517 .184 -8.24 .000
Pierce Corp Veil -1.176 .159 -7.40 .000
Environmental protection -.065 .198 -.33 .743
Sex Discrimination -.656 .106 -6.21 .000
Title VII -.799 .120 -6.66 .000
1st Circuit -.347 .121 -2.87 .004
2nd Circuit -.321 .112 -2.87 .004
3rd Circuit .262 .132 1.98 .047
4th Circuit -.638 .126 -5.06 .000
5th Circuit -.928 .113 -8.21 .000
6th Circuit -.584 .111 -5.28 .000
7th Circuit -.695 .101 -6.89 .000
8th Circuit -.567 .099 -5.74 .000
10th Circuit -.472 .118 -4.01 .000
11th Circuit -.590 .117 -5.06 .000
12th Circuit -.636 .167 -3.80 .000
Constant .331 .131 2.53 .011
Base case (constant) = 9th circuit, affirmative action cases, Republican
Number of obs   =       8475
LR chi2(23)     =     747.63
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Pseudo R2       =     0.0657
Log likelihood = -5318.8336
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